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ANOTHER WAY OF SKINNING THE RABBIT
RT. HON. PROFESSOR SIR GEOFFREY PALMER*

I have spent a week of serenity and tranquility in these magnificent
surroundings. I must say that they have stimulated my thought patterns and
helped my research. I find it a particularly joyful occasion because the
Dean of this law school was once my student. He was the most able student
that I have ever taught anywhere.
I find Professor Soifer's paper extraordinarily elegant and persuasive.
I arrive at that conclusion, of course, because it cites a New Zealand
decision with approval.' I doubt that you want a former New Zealand
Prime Minister to tell you how the Supreme Court of the United States
should be deciding its cases, even if he is the only prime minister that New
Zealand has ever had with an American law degree, so I decline to deal
with American constitutional developments. But the paper we are reviewing
has examined what it calls the Anglo American legal tradition in relation
to minorities.
I want to question first of all whether an Anglo American tradition
exists. I think it existed in the past. I'm not sure that it exists now. At
least there are two separate traditions. There is a tradition of English law.
There is a tradition of American Law. They are related in some respects,
but in one of the features with which this paper is most vitally concerned
they are fundamentally different. We share a common law heritage in
history but the traditions have become increasingly divergent. This is particularly true with respect to the appropriate role of courts in relationship
2
to the legislature and the extent of separation of powers.
English law knows nothing of judicial review of acts of Parliament.
There is no constitutional possibility in English law to have a statute declared
unconstitutional. New Zealand law is the same in this respect.3 The cases
which Professor Soifer quotes from England need to be read with that
understanding at the forefront of the reader's mind. The absence of that
power of judicial review makes a very big difference. The English tradition
depends for the protection of minorities very much more upon legislation
which is passed by Parliament. And, of course, Parliament does pass
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legislation on these subjects. The Race Relations Act is a very good example;
both England and New Zealand have race relations acts.4 Indeed, the New
Zealand case that Professor Soifer quotes arose from a criminal prosecution
brought under the Race Relations Act.
Nevertheless, a powerful tradition of courts protecting minorities exists
in the English common law. The tradition persists despite the fact that
courts do not have judicial review power in the sense that courts enjoy that
power in the United States. My argument is that the record of protecting
minorities in the English common law tradition is a solid achievement of
the common law. That record deserves more credit than Professor Soifer
gives it.
I want to bring to your attention an old case, the Case of James
Sommersett, a Negro, on a Habeas Corpus, decided in the court of King's
Bench in 1772 at a time when the old dominion of Virginia was still part
5
of His Majesty's realm.
Sommersett was a slave. He was confined in irons on a ship in the
Thames. The ship was bound for Jamaica. A writ of habeas corpus issued
to bring the body before the Court because Sommersett was the slave of
Charles Stewart, a Virginian. Stewart wanted to send Sommersett to Jamaica
to sell him as a slave. Sommersett was born in Africa and had worked in
Virginia, and had been brought by his master to England. After arriving
in England, he left his master's service, refusing to return. Extensive
affidavits were made to the Court of King's Bench about the slave trade
from Africa, the laws of Virginia and Jamaica, and the practice of selling
slaves as chattels. 6
One can tell from the very lengthy arguments in front of the court that
Lord Mansfield C.J. would have preferred not to decide the case. He put
it off for several months. Statements were made from the bar that there
were 15 thousand people in England in 1772 who were slaves. There was
also the issue of the English commercial interest in the slave trade. The
case had to be decided and Lord Mansfield decided it in a very forthright
fashion:
The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of
being introduced on any reasons, moral or political, but only by
positive law, which preserves its force long after the reasons, occasion, and time itself from whence it was created, is erased from
memory. It is so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support
it, but positive law. Whatever inconveniences, therefore, may follow
from the decision, I cannot say this case is allowed or approved by
7
the law of England; and therefore the black must be discharged.
4. Race Relations Act, 1976, ch. 74 (U.K.); Race Relations Act, [1971] 4 N.Z. Stat.
2246; see also Human Rights Commission Act, [1977] 1 N.Z. Stat. 384.
5. Case of James Sommersett, 20 Howaa's STATE TRa.s 2 (1771-72).
6. Id. These facts are gleaned from the report of the case which is lengthy, 82 pages.
Some of the precise facts are not entirely clear.
7. Id. at 82.
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The decision of the Court of Kings Bench by Lord Mansfield marks out
what is, I think, still a very strong tradition in English law. The court's
role is to protect minorities and to ensure that justice is done to them,
whatever the political and economic effects. That tradition lives on and I
am not sure that its strength and subtlety are reflected in Professor Soifer's
paper.
Now, if I can just move 12,000 miles away from the United Kingdom
to New Zealand, I want to say a word or two about the Maori people of
New Zealand and how the common law tradition in that country has dealt
with them. It is clear beyond any doubt that they are a discrete and insular
minority. Twelve and a half percent of New Zealand's population is Maori.
The tangata whenua of New Zealand arrived there before any Europeans.
In 1867 four seats of parliament were reserved for them. The law has been
changed in many respects since then, of course, but four Maori seats still
exist." Maori may stand for general seats as well, and this often happens.
Maori can decide on which electoral roll they wish to be. In order, therefore,
to decide who is Maori for electoral purposes the same issue that Professor
Soifer mentioned arises. Who is a Maori? The answer is, whoever says that
he or she is a Maori. That is to say, someone who claims a Maori ancestor.
No way of checking such claims exists, nor is any attempt made to check
them.
Furthermore, the Treaty of Waitangi, entered into between Queen
Victoria and the various Maori tribes of New Zealand in 1840, has increasingly become an instrument through which the courts are giving Maori a
number of very important economic rights. For years, the courts of New
Zealand said that the Treaty of Waitangi was not part of New Zealand
law. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Counsel, New Zealand's highest
court of appeal, so held as recently as 1941. 9 However, Parliament has
passed various statutes that mention the Treaty of Waitangi. In. 1975,
Parliament passed a statute setting up a tribunal to allow Maori to make
claims regarding the treaty.' 0 In 1986 the jurisdiction of that tribunal was
extended back to 1840 so that grievances which had arisen back to that
date could be examined and reported upon to the government by the
Waitangi Tribunal."
In 1986, there came before the New Zealand courts the most important
case ever to come before those courts involving the Maori minority of New
Zealand. The Court of Appeal said, "This case is perhaps as important for
the future of our country as any that has come before a New Zealand
Court." 12 It was a case in which the New Zealand Court of Appeal showed
great boldness in using history to protect a minority. The government had

8. Re Hunua Election Petition, [1979] 1 N.Z.L.R. 251.
9. Hoani Te Heuheu Tukino v. Aotea District Maori Land Board, [1941] A.C. 308

(P.C.).
10. Treaty of Waitangi Act, [1975] 2 N.Z. Stat. 825.
11. Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act, [1985] 3 N.Z. Stat. 1335.
12. New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General, [1987] 1 N.Z.L.R. 641, 651.
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passed the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986. The policy was to transfer
extensive government assets, land, forests, telephone companies, post offices,
and coal mines to commercial corporations. The level of efficiency of those
enterprises under the rules of the public service had been abysmal. The new
policy was that these enterprises were to be run on commercial principles,
not by ministers and public servants.
The New Zealand Maori Council brought an action in the Court to
stop the transfer until provision had been made for Maori claims to be
settled. The statute provided "Nothing in this Act shall permit the Crown
to act in a manner that is inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of
Waitangi.' ' 3 The President of the Court of Appeal said:
The prosaic language of the Court's formal orders should not be
allowed to obscure the fact that the Maori people have succeeded
in this case. Some might speak of a victory, but Courts do not
usually use that kind of language. At the outset I mentioned that
each member of the Court was writing a separate judgment. It will
be seen that approaching the case independently we have all reached
two major conclusions. First that the principles of the Treaty of
Waitangi override everything else in the State-Owned Enterprises
Act. Second that those principles require the Pakeha and Maori
Treaty partners to act towards each other reasonably and with the
utmost good faith.
The duty is no light one. It is infinitely more than a formality. If
a breach of the duty is demonstrated at any time, the duty of the
Court will be to insist that it be honoured.
4
All too clearly there have been breaches in the past.'
The Court referred explicitly to past history. The President went on to
say, "The effect of our present decision, built on the Treaty of Waitangi
Act and the State Owned Enterprises Act, is that in relation to land now
held by the Crown it should never again be possible to put aside a Maori
grievance in that way. The Crown now has to work out a system to
safeguard Maori claims regarding the land covered by the 1986 Act before
any land can be transferred to a state enterprise.' ' 5 That was done.
Parliament worked out and passed a further act to ensure that all Maori
claims could be protected and the Court was then pleased to dismiss the
proceedings.' 6
Many other cases have arisen in New Zealand involving Maori interests.
One case dealt with fishing interests. The Maori secured a great victory in
that case and secured, after negotiation, 10% of the total allowable catch

13.
14.
15.
16.

State-Owned Enterprises Act § 9, [1986] 3 N.Z. Stat. 1306, 1310.
Maori Council, [1987] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 667.
Id. at 668.
Id. at 719. See Treaty of Waitangi [State Enterprises] Act, [1988] 2 N.Z. Stat. 881.
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in the New Zealand fishing industry. 7 I do not want to go into the details.
What I simply want to do is to mention that perhaps Professor Soifer has
been too sweeping in suggesting that the common law tradition, at least in
the Commonwealth, is unable to deal effectively with the problems of
minorities.
Even when traditionally no judicial review exists, the courts have shown
some ability to handle these issues. They have been moderately progressive.
I think that the absence of judicial review has also meant that the political
organs of government are forced to respond to the problems of minorities.
They are held to account. Because they are forced to respond, they pass
statutes in a general way which the courts interpret in a specific way. It is
easier to decide upon progressive policies for minorities so long as it is in
terms of general principles. But the Parliament cannot reverse itself easily
when hard cases produce politically unpalatable results. The interaction is
an interesting one. The power of statutory interpretation in the common
law tradition is a strong and powerful instrument in the hands of a
determined court.
While not wanting to comment on the vagaries of constitutional interpretation in the United States, I've been coming to the United States long
enough to see fashions change. There are occasions on which judicial review
gets too far out of step with public opinion. Part of the common law
tradition is the tradition of parliamentary supremacy. The American tradition these days seems to be saying legislatures for a variety of reasons
cannot act. There is a pressing need to act. Therefore, the courts should
act. It becomes a self fulfilling prophecy. You can hardly complain when
the courts do things you do not like when they are invested with such
power. Neither will legislatures do much if someone else can be found to
take the heat. The purpose of my remarks has been to suggest that it is
possible to skin the rabbit another way.

17. Section 88(2) of the Fisheries Act of 1983 provides that "Nothing in this Act shall
affect any Maori fishing rights." [1983] 1 N.Z. Stat. 79, 135. This section has been before
the courts many times in recent years. See Te Weehi v. Regional Fisheries Officer, [1986] 1
N.Z.L.R. 680.

